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Abstract. The water infrastructure is critical to human life, but little
attention has been paid to the nuances of the water industry. Without
such attention, evaluating security innovation in this domain without
compromising the productivity goals when delivering water services is
difficult. This paper proposes four nuances that need to be incorporated
into a representative specification exemplar for the water industry; these
provided input to the exemplar based on a fictional water company.
1 Introduction
The water infrastructure is one infrastructure we cannot do without. Despite the
citing of water industry vulnerabilities as a motivation for critical infrastructure
protection [1], there has been little work considering the nuances of this sector.
As such, it is implicitly assumed that addressing security issues in one form of
critical infrastructure effectively addresses the issues in all others. There are,
however, many reasons why this may not be the case.
Previous work like [2] proposed security innovation in the water industry,
but is premised on scenarios associated with the distribution of clean water only.
However, threats in the quality of water distribution have also been identified
due to loss of pressurised water, aging infrastructure, as well as vulnerabilities
in interdependent infrastructure [3,4,5]. While case studies provide a means of
disseminating nuances to the broader research and practitioner communities,it
would be useful to share such insights using a format suitable for evaluating new
innovation by researchers, or products and services by practitioners.
Specification exemplars are self-contained, informal descriptions of a problem
in some application domain, and are designed to capture the harshness of reality
[6]. They are designed to advance a single research effort, promote research and
understanding among multiple researchers, and contribute to the advancement
of software development practice. They should exhibit the “messy” nature of the
real-world, but such messiness is difficult to elicit without actual case study data;
commercial confidentiality concerns often impede access to such data. Specifica-
tion exemplars also focus on modelling functional concerns, but many nuances
related to human issues are not so easily modelled. For example, previous work
has suggested that the tensions that exist between security and safety can be
addressed by designing security that ‘Homer Simpson’ can use [7]. However,
trivialising all critical infrastructure users in such a way fails to consider how
their skills and expertise are brought to bear when solving difficult, but not
unrealistic, operational challenges.
In this paper we propose four nuaunces that need to be incorporated into a
representative specification exemplar for the water industry. We present these
nuances in Section 2, and briefly summarise their implications in Section 3.
2 Water Industry Nuances
We examined the empirical data from two previous studies designing security for
the water industry [8,9]; this data included 11 contextual interview transcripts,
4 facilitated workshop transcripts, and a variety of photographs taken during
several site visits. Following this review of case study data, four types of nuances
that need to be incorporated into a specification exemplar were identified.
2.1 Organisational Nuances
To many people, water companies are predominantly concerned with the supply
of clean (drinking) water. However, in many cases, water companies are also con-
cerned with the infrastructure associated with distributing and treating waste
water as well. At first blush, waste water issues may not appear security criti-
cal, but there are obvious environmental implications if poorly treated water is
inadvertently pumped into waterways. Similarly, accidental or deliberate harm
to terminal pumping stations can pose a flooding risk to residential or commer-
cial properties in the vicinity of waste water treatment plants, together with the
health risks that this entails.
Like many other firms, water companies are also under pressure to save money
and reduce energy consumption. As a result, water companies carry out internal
projects to optimise equipment in order to reduce energy consumption. However,
there can be tensions because the drive to save energy and money might lead
to elaborate and unpredictable changes to process operations. If not carefully
managed, such changes might lead to human error if changes made by techni-
cians are complex, or violations in order to save time or achieve goals deemed
more important than security. Such errors and violations can be source of latent
failures which, over time, can contribute to catastrophic failures [10].
2.2 Operational Nuances
A water company depends on the skills and expertise of the people that run it.
The operations and goals associated with plant operators and technicians can
vary based on a variety of contextual conditions such as geographical locale,
time of day, or even the season of the year; these conditions may truncate or
extend activities, and practices are shaped around these different conditions.
For example, plant operators may be called away to fix problems around a site
depending on the availability of other staff and, depending on the site, may be
required to carry out remedial activities associated with other roles, such as
taking water samples to check agreed water quality criteria are met.
The use of technology for what appears to be innocuous physical artifacts
is also shaped to satisfy operational requirements in such a way that they be-
come key assets. While not normally considered a critical device, TVs in control
rooms are often used to check weather reports to determine whether it was nec-
essary to pump water from reservoirs to treatment sites. Security practices are
also shaped around operational needs as well with default account logout times
sometimes timed to correspond with shift hours, and information – ranging from
contact phone numbers to Chlorine levels – is often written on whiteboards in
control rooms; these whiteboards act as the collective memory for plant staff.
Consequently, such settings can be modified without it being obvious who might
have made the changes, and how warranted they might be.
2.3 Environmental Nuances
Unlike electricity, water cannot simply be turned off. A water company’s infras-
tructure might support a large geographical region, with water pumped over 40
miles to the plant that treats it; this necessitates a large estate of supporting
infrastructure to control water flow, and satisfy agreed water quality standards.
After a prolonged period of hot weather, settlement can build up in the waste
water distribution system; if the weather suddenly changes, this settlement can
hit the treatment works at once and, if flow is obstructed, can lead to down-
stream flooding. The quality of water can also change in less than an hour due
to weather conditions, and quality can be further exacerbated by accidents such
as oil tanker spills. Automated monitoring plays an important role in monitoring
clean or waste water quality, but so does human intervention and the ability to
spot changes that appear unusual. As Section 2.1 illustrates, undertaking these
processes can become error prone depending on the precise context in which any
intervention takes place.
2.4 Physical Security and Safety Nuances
As important as cybersecurity is, the most pressing concern faced by many stake-
holders are day-to-day physical security and safety issues. These include threats
associated with the theft of metal parts for scrap. The form such attacks can
take are myriad, and include theft of gates and fencing, and the damage of asso-
ciated infrastructure – such as power lines – to get at copper earth connectors.
Petty theft is also a concern due to externalities that might be introduced as a
result. For example, the value of a stolen PC is insignificant compared to the
overall impact on the infrastructure that is no longer being monitored or main-
tained as a result. These physical security issues also have a personal impact on
stakeholders like technicians and plant operators. Plant operators working alone
at night might be apprehensive about confronting a team of scrap metal thieves,
particularly if the plant is located in a remote, countryside location. This im-
pacts how they might choose to respond to an alarm, and how they might carry
out any remedial action.
3 Conclusion
This paper has presented four nuances that need to be incorporated into a repre-
sentative specification exemplar for the water industry. In analysing pre-existing
case study material, we have identified several classes of nuance with the poten-
tial to impact security in water companies. This impact might result from the
direct loss of a physical asset, or from latent failures resulting from excessive
physical and mental effort by plant operators or technicians. A limitation of this
work is that these nuance classes may be specific to the water domain. We are,
however, currently analysing case study data within the rail sector to see if such
nuance classes are applicable there. We developed a specification exemplar for a
fictional water company that encapsulates the nuances described. Further details
and an evaluation of this exemplar will be described in future work.
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